log m log log m , n)) for the individual step complexity of a wait-free m-valued adopt-commit object implemented using multi-writer registers for n anonymous processes. While the upper bound is deterministic, the lower bound holds for randomized adopt-commit objects as well. Our results are based on showing that adopt-commit objects are equivalent, up to small additive constants, to a simpler class of objects that we call conflict detectors.
Introduction
An adopt-commit object [2, 21] or ratifier [3] is a one-shot shared-memory object that represents the adopt-commit protocols of Gafni [15] and can be used to implement round-based protocols for set-agreement and consensus. An m-valued adopt-commit object supports a single operation, AdoptCommit(u), where u is an input from a set of m values. The result of this operation is an output of the form (commit, v) or (adopt, v) , where the second component is a value from this set and the first component is a decision bit that indicates whether the process should decide value v immediately or adopt it as its preferred value in later rounds of the protocol. Improving the performance of adopt-commit objects can improve the performance of consensus protocols that use them. Lower bounds on adopt-commit objects also yield immediate lower bounds on consensus.
The requirements for an adopt-commit object are:
1. Validity. The output value of an operation is the input of some (possibly different) operation. 2. Termination. With probability 1, each nonfaulty process produces an output in a finite number of steps, where the probability is taken over the coin tosses performed by the algorithm. 3. Coherence. 1 
If the output of some operation is (commit, v), then every output is either (adopt, v) or (commit, v).

Convergence. If all inputs are v, all outputs are (commit, v).
These requirements are closely related to the validity, termination, and agreement requirements for consensus. The difference is that agreement (which requires that all outputs are the same) is replaced by the weaker requirements of coherence and convergence. As observed in [3] , this means that consensus objects satisfy the requirements of adopt-commit objects, if each process returns the decision bit commit together with its output value. It follows that lower bounds on adopt-commit objects immediately give lower bounds on consensus objects.
Until now, the best implementations of m-valued adopt-commit objects had Θ(n) individual step complexity, for n processes [15] , or Θ(log m) individual step complexity, for any number of processes [3] . Both these implementations are deterministic, but the latter is also anonymous. This means that all processes run the same code. Differences between the behaviour of two different processes can arise only as a result of different input values, (different supplies of random bits, in the case of a randomized protocol), and when they are scheduled. A number of advantages of anonymity are discussed in [5] .
Here, we consider how much further we can improve the complexity of an implementation of an adopt-commit object without losing anonymity. We give two simple, deterministic anonymous protocols for detecting multiple input values, from which we obtain implementations of m-valued adopt-commit objects. One of these has O(n) individual step complexity, given an upper bound, n, on the number of processes. The other has O( log m log log m ) individual step complexity, for any number of processes. While this is only a small improvement in complexity, we show a matching lower bound on the individual step complexity of any anonymous implementation (including randomized implementations against an oblivious adversary) of an m-valued adopt-commit object that supports at least Ω( log m log log m ) processes. Our lower bound also implies a lower bound of Ω( log m log log m ) on the individual step complexity for randomized anonymous consensus with sufficiently many processes, even against an oblivious adversary.
We can extend our anonymous bounds to give a partial characterization of the worst-case individual step complexity for non-anonymous adopt-commit objects. We show that deterministic non-anonymous implementations have a worst-case individual step complexity between Ω(min( log m log log m , √ log n log log n )) and O(min( log m log log m , log n)).
Conflict Detectors
We introduce a simpler object, a conflict detector, and show that it can be implemented from an adopt-commit object. We also show that a conflict detector and registers can be used to implement an adopt-commit object. An m-valued conflict detector supports a single operation, check(v), with input v from a set of m values. It returns true (to indicate a conflict) or false (to indicate no conflicts), and has the following two properties:
• In any execution that contains a check(v) operation and a (v ) operation with v = v , at least one of these two operations returns true.
• In any execution in which all check operations have the same input value, they all return false.
Non-linearizability
Neither adopt-commit objects nor conflict detectors are required to be linearizable. An implementation of an object is linearizable [17] if, for any execution in which processes perform operations on the implemented object, there is a sequential execution with the same operations such that each operation returns the same response in both executions and non-concurrent operations in the original execution occur in the same order as in the sequential execution. It is easy to show that neither adopt-commit objects nor conflict detectors have deterministic linearizable implementations from atomic registers, and our implementations are not linearizable. In a solo execution (in which only one process runs), adoptCommit(v) must return (commit, v), since it is possible that no process has a conflicting input. Hence, if the first operation linearized in an execution is adoptCommit(v), then it must return (commit, v) , and the output value of every subsequent adoptCommit operation in the execution must be v. Hence a deterministic linearizable implementation of an adopt-commit object gives rise to a deterministic implementation of consensus, which does not exist [14, 18] . Similarly, the first check operation linearized in any execution of a conflict detector must return false and subsequent check operations with different inputs must return true, which can be used to implement test-and-set, for which no deterministic implementation from registers exists [16] .
Equivalence of Adopt-Commit Objects and Conflict Detectors
In this section, we show that the individual step complexities of adopt-commit objects and conflict detectors differ by small additive constants. Because our reductions are anonymous, this also holds for anonymous implementations. We use T ac and T ch to denote the worst case step complexities of the adoptCommitand check operations, respectively.
We begin by giving a straightforward implementation of a conflict detector from an adopt-commit object. The code is presented in Algorithm 1.
shared data:
adopt-commit object r. Proof If all check operations have the same input u, then, they all call r.adoptCommit (u) , which, by the convergence property, all return (commit, u). Consequently, all the check(u) operations return false.
Suppose there is an execution in which two operations, check(u) and check(u ), are performed, where u = u . These operations call r.adoptCommit(u) and r.adoptCommit(u ), respectively. By coherence, either the result of r.adoptCommit(u) is not (commit, u) or the result of r.adoptCommit(u ) is not (commit, u ) . It follows that true is returned by at least one of these two check operations. Thus, Algorithm 1 implements a conflict detector.
The step complexity of check is the same as the step complexity of adoptCommit, since only line 3 contains a nonlocal operation.
Conversely, an adopt-commit object can be implemented from a conflict detector and two registers. One of the registers, conflict, contains a single bit. It is initially false and is set to true when a process detects a conflict. It is never reset to false. Each process reads conflict immediately before returning and uses its value to determine its decision bit. The other register, proposal, initially contains the special value ⊥, which is different from all input values. A process writes its input value to proposal after reading it and seeing that it contains ⊥. The code is presented in Algorithm 2.
shared data:
register conflict, initially false; register proposal, initially ⊥; conflict detector c. procedure adoptCommit(v) begin Proof The output value of an adoptCommit operation is its input value, if the process performing the operation read that proposal has value ⊥ on line 5. Otherwise, the value it read from proposal is output. Since the only values written to proposal are input values, validity is satisfied.
If all inputs have the same value, w, then check always returns false, so conflict remains false. Thus, every output is (commit, w) and convergence is satisfied.
If some adoptCommit operation returns (commit, w), then the process, p, performing this operation either read w from proposal on line 5 or it wrote w to proposal on line 7. It also read that conflict = false on line 12. In particular, this means that p did not perform line 3 and, hence, received false from check. Thus, all processes that perform check with input values different from w receive true and will set conflict to true on line 3 before reading proposal on line 5. Since process p read conflict before it was set to true, proposal had value w before these processes read it. Thus, none of them read ⊥ from proposal and, hence, the value of proposal does not change after w is written to it. It follows that they can only read w from proposal and return (adopt, w). All processes with input value w, including p, can only read ⊥ or w from proposal and, hence, they can only output (commit, w) or (adopt, w). It follows that coherence is satisfied.
Reads and writes to shared registers occur only on lines 3, 5, 7, and 12. Thus, the step complexity of adoptCommit is 4 greater than the step complexity of check.
The simplicity of a conflict detector makes it easier to obtain bounds on its step complexity. In the next two sections, we obtain asymptotically matching upper and lower bounds for anonymous implementations of conflict detectors. These results imply the same bounds for anonymous adopt-commit objects.
Upper Bounds on Anonymous Conflict Detectors
In this section, we give two complementary implementations of anonymous m-valued conflict detectors. The first uses O( log m log log m ) steps for any number of processes, while the second uses O(n) steps, for any value of m, where n is an upper bound on the number of processes. By choosing the first implementation when m is small and the second when m is large, we obtain a conflict detector that runs in O(min( log m log log m , n)) steps. We show this bound is optimal in Sect. 4. Proof If all calls to check have the same input value w, then only w will be written to each register R [i] and no process ever observes any value other than w or ⊥. In this case, all operations correctly return false. Now suppose there is an execution E in which two processes, p u and p u , with different input values, u and u , both return false. Then both processes read from all of the registers R [1] , . . . , R [k] and the values u and u will both be written to all of the registers. Let j, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be two indexes such that j occurs before j in π u , but j occurs before j in π u . Without loss of generality, suppose that u is written to R[j ] before u is written to R[j ] in E. Then, when p u or any other process with value u reads R[j ], it will not see ⊥. This is because, before it reads R[j ], it either writes u to R[j ] or reads u from R[j ]. This implies that no process writes u to R[j ], which is a contradiction.
A Collect-Based Conflict Detector
Algorithm 4 is another implementation of a conflict detector. It places no limit on the number of distinct values m, but it works only when an upper bound, n, on the number of processes is known. The worst-case individual step complexity of a check(v) operation in Algorithm 4 is 3n + 1.
The essential idea is that once some process finishes the first loop in check(v) and sets done to true, each of the at most n − 1 other processes can write to at most one location in R before seeing done = true and leaving the loop. Because no process executes the collect in the second loop until done = true, any views obtained by two different processes in this loop can differ in at most n−1 places. It follows that no two processes with different inputs can both see their own input in all n positions during the collect. Therefore, at least one of them will return true. If all calls to check have the same input, then only this input will appear in R, so all the calls will return false.
More formally, we have shown: 
A Lower Bound on Anonymous Conflict Detectors
In this section, we show that any m-valued conflict detector for n anonymous processes has Ω(min( log m log log m , n)) worst-case solo step complexity, which measures the maximum number of steps taken in any solo execution.
Fix some deterministic anonymous implementation of an m-valued conflict detector. For each input value v, we consider the solo execution E v in which a process executes check(v) starting from the initial configuration. Note that, because processes are deterministic and anonymous, the sequence of operations in E v is fully determined by v.
Let k v be the step complexity of E v . Let W v be the set of registers that a process writes to in E v and let X v be the set of registers that it reads from but does not write to. Let A v be the permutation of W v ∪ X v arranged in the order in which the registers in W v are first written and the registers in X v are last read in E v .
Lemma 5 For all distinct input values u and v, if
Proof Suppose there are two input values u = v such that k u + k v ≤ n and all regis-
occur in the same order in A u and A v . We show that an adversary can construct an execution E involving k u + k v ≤ n processes that is indistinguishable from E u to some process p u performing check(u) and indistinguishable from E v to some other process p v performing check(v). In this execution, both p u and p v return false, violating the specification of a conflict detector.
For each
, let σ i,u be the first write to R i in E u and, for each
The adversary starts by constructing an interleaving E of the operations in E u and E v . The operations in E u appear in the same order in E . The adversary schedules each read operation σ i,v ∈ S v immediately before σ i,u and schedules each write operation σ i,v ∈ S v immediately after σ i,u . Note that, by assumption, the operations in S v appear in the same order in E as they do in E v , namely, in the order the registers
If no operations in S v occur between σ i,v and σ j,v , then, in E , the adversary arbitrarily interleaves the operations in E v that occur strictly between σ i,v and σ j,v with the operations in E u that occur strictly between σ i,u and σ j,u . Likewise, the adversary arbitrarily interleaves the operations in E v that occur before the first operation in S v with the operations in E u that occur before the first operation in S u and the operations in E v that occur after the last operation in S v with the operations in E u that occur after the last operation in S u . Hence, the operations in E v appear in the same order in E .
The sequence of operations in E is not necessarily a valid execution, because p u may read a value written by p v or p v may read a value written by p u . To prevent this, we add clones, as used in [13] . A clone of a process p is a process with the same input and code as p, which proceeds in lockstep with p, reading and writing the same values as p, until immediately before some write to a register. The adversary has the clone perform that write at some later point in the execution to ensure that the value p reads from that register is the same as the value p last wrote there. After performing its delayed write, a clone performs no further steps.
For each register R i ∈ W u ∩ W v , the adversary adds one clone of p u to E for each read of R i by p u after σ i,v and one clone of p v to E for each read of R i by p v after σ i,v . Because there are at most k u − 1 such reads by p u and at most k v − 1 such reads by p v , this requires at most k u + k v − 2 clones, for a total of k u + k v ≤ n processes. Let E be the resulting execution.
If R i ∈ W u ∩ W v , then, by construction, any read of R i by p u in E after σ i,v sees the same value it saw in E u , namely, the value it last wrote to R i . Any read of R i prior to σ i,u sees the initial value of R i , since σ i,u and σ i,v are, by definition, the first writes to R i by p u and p v in E and, hence, E.
If R i ∈ X u ∩ W v , then all reads of R i by p u in E occur at or before σ i,u and, hence, see the initial value of R i , as they do in E u . This is because, in E, all writes to R i by p v occur at or after σ i,v , which is after σ i,u .
If 
A i be the set of all elements appearing in any of the sequences A 1 , . . . , A m . Choose an ordering of A uniformly at random. Let X i be the indicator variable that has value 1, if the ordering of the elements in A i is consistent with this ordering, and has value 0, otherwise.
Note that X i = 1 implies that X j = 0 for all j = i. This is because x i,j and y i,j appear in different orders in A i and A j . It follows that X ≤ 1.
For each sequence A i , the probability that it is consistent with the chosen ordering is exactly
Theorem 1 The worst-case solo step complexity of any deterministic anonymous implementation of an m-valued conflict detector for n processes is at least
Proof Fix any deterministic anonymous implementation of an m-valued conflict detector for n processes and let k be its worst-case solo step complexity. Then, for every input value v,
, then the claim is true, so suppose that k ≤ n/2. Then, for all distinct inputs u and v, k u + k v ≤ n and, hence, by Lemma 5, there are two registers that occur in different orders in A u and A v . It follows from Lemma 6 that v
. This matches the upper bound from Sect. 3 to within a small constant factor.
From Lemma 1, it follows that T ac ≥ T ch . Thus, we get a lower bound for the step complexity of adopt-commit objects.
Because the requirements for conflict detectors are safety properties, we can show that the lower bound applies to randomized anonymous implementations of conflict detectors, as well.
Corollary 1 Given any randomized anonymous implementation of an m-valued conflict detector for n processes, there is an input v such that any solo execution of check(v)
has step complexity at least min(fact −1 (m), n/2) with probability 1 against an oblivious adversary.
Proof Suppose not. Then, for each input v, there is some sequence of coin-flip outcomes that causes a process p v with input v to complete a solo execution of check(v) in less than min(fact −1 (m), n/2) steps. Let E v be the solo execution of the deterministic protocol obtained by fixing the coin-flips to have these outcomes. The proof of Theorem 1 constructs a combined execution E in which two processes p u and p v with different inputs both return false. Such an execution occurs with nonzero probability in the randomized algorithm, because p u , p v , and all of their respective clones can generate these fixed sequences of coin-flip outcomes. This violates the correctness of the implementation.
The corresponding lower bound also holds for randomized anonymous implementations of adopt-commit objects.
Extension to Non-anonymous Algorithms
In Sect. 5.1, we show how the lower bound of Theorem 1 for anonymous adoptcommit implementations can be extended to deterministic non-anonymous implementations, at the cost of greatly reducing the part of the bound that depends on n. Some of this reduction is necessary: In Sect. 5.2, we show that, if processes have identities, it is possible to construct a conflict detector for arbitrarily many values with O(log n) worst-case step complexity, which is substantially smaller than the Ω(n) lower bound for anonymous conflict detectors.
A Lower Bound for Non-anonymous Conflict Detectors
In the anonymous lower bound, once the process in a solo execution E v writes to a register, we can use delayed writes by clones of that process to ensure that, when E v is interleaved with any other solo execution E u , it will not see a value written to that register at a later step in E u . Without anonymity, we no longer have clones to use for this purpose.
Instead, we can use different processes with the same input value, if enough of them write to the same location. However, if the number of shared registers is very large or unbounded, the processes may spread out too much for this to work. If this occurs, we adopt a different strategy and crash all processes that write to a register visible in some other execution E u ; this is organized by reserving a small fraction of the registers for each input value and only allowing processes with that input value to access (read or write) those registers. The vast majority of registers remain unreserved.
As in the anonymous case, we construct an execution E v , for each input value v, that is organized into t rounds. Each round may consist of many operations on many different registers, with at most one operation by each process. We preserve the basic structure of the anonymous lower bound: in each round we allow at most one more unreserved register to be accessed by processes in E v , but only if enough processes access it simultaneously. We can think of this construction as a form of layered execution in the sense of Moses and Rajsbaum [20] , where those processes that do not crash or suffer delays execute approximately synchronously.
Enforcing the restrictions on which registers are accessed depends on the adversary's ability to crash processes that want to violate them. In fact, our construction crashes almost all remaining processes in each round.
It may also delay writes by some processes to cover registers that may be accessed in later rounds. As in other covering arguments, these delayed write operations may be used to erase evidence of any other execution E v that might be interleaved with E v by overwriting registers shared between the two executions in later rounds.
This leaves a small number of active processes, which have not crashed and have not been delayed. Each of these take a step in the round. Careful management of the number of active processes is a central part of the adversary's strategy. This also requires a very large initial supply of processes, exponential in the number of rounds, t.
To make the adversary's strategy work, it is necessary to have a good partition of the registers between those which are unreserved and those which are reserved for each input value. Computing such a partition explicitly appears to be difficult. Instead, we apply the probabilistic method and show that, if an adversary chooses the partition from an appropriate probability distribution, there is a nonzero probability enough processes remain active after each round.
A complication in this approach is that a particularly perverse algorithm might exploit knowledge of the register partition to force too many processes to be crashed. To limit the algorithm's ability to determine information about the partition, even attempts by processes with input value v to read a register that is reserved for value v result in crashes most of the time, if that register has not been previously accessed. Then the fact that some process crashed after attempting to access a register gives only limited information about the part of the partition to which it belongs. We make this observation rigorous using conditional probabilities. (See Lemma 8.)
The construction of the executions E v , for input values v. is given in the proof of Lemma 7, which is presented in Sect. 5.1.1. 
Lemma 7 For any deterministic implementation of an m-valued
Proof of Lemma 7
Initially, the adversary randomly labels each register with an input value, indicating that it is reserved for that value, or with the value * , indicating that it is unreserved.
Massive slaughter of processes at each round is used to eliminate processes that are about to access the wrong registers. During the construction, the adversary uses more randomness to make it difficult for the processes to identify which registers have been labeled with which values, by randomly crashing many processes that would otherwise be accessing a register labeled by their input value. We show that this procedure produces a family of executions with the desired properties with nonzero probability. It follows that such a family exists. The labels of the registers are chosen independently. Let (r) = * with probability 1 − 1 2tm . For each input value v, let (r) = v with probability 1 2tm 2 . Having fixed a labeling, each E v is constructed separately, round-by-round. In order to avoid crashing too many processes, the adversary budgets for at least s i = (8t 3 m 3 ) t−i t active processes at the end of each round i. This requires s 0 = 8 t m 3t t 3t+1 processes initially in each of the m different executions E v , or n = s 0 m = 8 t m 3t+1 t 3t+1 processes in total.
The adversary is successful in round i for input value v, if it has constructed an i round execution satisfying the requirements of Lemma 7 and, at the end of which, there are at least s i active processes.
Conversely, the goal of the algorithm is to force the adversary to crash as many processes as possible. To simplify the proof, we imagine that the algorithm is capable of perfectly coordinating the active processes with input value v, so it can deploy active processes to whatever registers it likes at each round. We will also imagine that it learns the label of any register read or written by any process. Note that, as long as requirement 2 of Lemma 7 holds, these labels can only be v or * . We call a register's label known whenever the register has previously been accessed.
We will say that a process that is active at the beginning of round i survives round i if it is still active at the end of the round. Specifically, this means that the process is not crashed or delayed in round i and, thus, takes one step during the round. In each round i of E v , all active processes with pending operations on registers with known label v survive. All active processes with pending reads on registers with known label * also survive, as do all active processes with pending writes on registers with known label * to which a write has occurred in a previous round of E v . Consider each register r with known label * , to which no writes have occurred in E v prior to round i. If there are at least t − i + 1 active processes with input v and pending writes to r, delay t − i of these writes and let the remaining active processes with input v and pending writes to r register survive. (They perform their writes before the processes that read from r.) Otherwise, crash all active processes with pending writes to r. Let s i denote the number of surviving active processes with pending accesses to registers with known labels.
If s i ≥ s i , then all other active processes are crashed. Otherwise, the adversary will attempt to obtain at least s i − s i additional survivors from among active processes with pending accesses to registers with unknown labels.
First, suppose there is some register with an unknown label to which at least s i − s i active processes have pending reads or to which at least s i − s i + t − i + 1 processes have pending accesses. Let r be the register with smallest index with this property. Note that this choice of register does not depend on the register labeling, so the algorithm learns nothing about the labels of registers that are not chosen. If r is reserved for v, let all the active processes with pending operations on r survive and crash all active processes with pending accesses on other registers with unknown labels. If r is reserved for a value other than v, we declare the adversary's strategy to have failed. We bound the probability that this bad event occurs below. If r is unreserved, then all active processes with pending accesses on other registers with unknown labels are crashed. If there are at least s i − s i active processes with pending reads from r, then also crash all processes with pending writes to r. Otherwise, there are at least s i − s i + t − i + 1 processes with pending accesses to r, of which at least t − i + 1 are writes. Delay t − i of the writes and schedule the remaining writes to r before the reads from r. In either case, requirement 4 of Lemma 7 is satisfied.
If none of the previous cases apply, we crash all active processes with pending accesses on registers with unknown label other than v. For each register r with unknown label v, with probability 1 − 1/t, we crash every process that attempts to access r in this round and, with probability 1/t, we allow all processes to successfully perform their accesses on r. If there are fewer than s i − s i processes that successfully access registers with unknown label v, the adversary's strategy also fails.
To summarize, the adversary has three ways to retain s i active processes at the end of round i while maintaining the constraints of Lemma 7:
1. It can keep s i processes that carry out operations on processes with known labels, either (a) reading or writing a register with known label v; (b) reading a register with known label * ; or (c) writing a register r with known label * , provided t − i processes writing to r can be delayed so that their write operations can be used in later rounds to overwrite values that might be written during some other execution E v . 2. If this does not leave enough active processes, but there is a register r with unknown label that is accessed by sufficiently many processes, attempt to access the first such r. This succeeds if it turns out that (r) = * or v. 3. Alternatively, if there is no such register r, attempt to assemble sufficiently many additional processes from among those accessing registers with unknown label v, permitting each register to be used with probability 1/t. This succeeds if the total number of processes that access permitted registers is high enough.
The intuition is that if the first branch of the adversary's strategy doesn't work, then the remaining processes are either tightly concentrated on one register (making the second branch likely to work) or spread out among many registers (making the third branch likely to work). Which branch applies is entirely controlled by where the algorithm chooses to place pending operations by the active processes. These choices in turn depend on the outcome of previous rounds. For a fixed algorithm, we can think of the execution E v as a random variable that depends only on the labels of the registers and the random choices made in the third branch (whether or not to permit access to registers with unknown label v). Let E i v denote the first i rounds of E v . This is also a random variable.
A maximally perverse algorithm will mostly avoid having processes access registers with known labels. This reduces the analysis to two cases, depending on whether the algorithm sends sufficiently many active processes to a single register with an unknown label. In both cases, success depends on the labels of the unknown registers.
Because the algorithm can use information from previous rounds, the distribution of these labels conditioned on the algorithm's knowledge is not the same as the original distribution. We begin by showing that it does change by much.
Lemma 8 Let E be any specific i-round partial execution after which register r has an unknown label. Then:
and
Proof First observe that, as the labels of the registers are independent, any event in E that does not involve r has no effect on the conditional distribution of (r). Similarly, any event involving r whose outcome does not depend on (r) also has no effect. This includes attempts to access r by processes that are crashed when there are sufficiently many processes accessing registers with known labels and in the case that there are sufficiently many processes accessing the same register with unknown label. This leaves only the third branch, in which the choice of whether or not to crash a process that attempts to access r depends on whether (r) = v.
To formalize this intuition, let A be the event that all of the following are consistent with E i v = E: (a) the labels of all registers other than r; (b) in each of the first i rounds, whether the third branch of the adversary's strategy is applied; and (c) in rounds where the third branch is applied, which registers r = r cause processes accessing them to crash. Note that (r) is independent of A.
In the following, we assume i ≥ 1. If not, E i v is empty and conditioning on it has no effect.
Let C be the event that every attempt in E i v to access r fails, or, equivalently, that register r has an unknown label at the end of E i v . Hence, the event E i v = E is the intersection of the events A and C. This implies that conditioning on E i v = E is equivalent to conditioning on both A and C.
, where j is the number of rounds of E in which the third branch of the adversary's strategy is applied and at least one process attempts to access register r. The last inequality holds because (1 − 1/t) t is increasing in t for t ≥ 1.
Let
. Applying the definition of conditional probability, we have:
Corollary 2 Suppose that, in round i, after E i−1
v , the algorithm forces the second branch of the adversary's strategy (in which there are sufficiently many processes accessing the same register with unknown label). Then the probability that the adversary strategy fails in round i conditioned on this event is less than 1 2tm .
Proof The probability of failure is just the conditional probability that (r) is neither v nor * for the chosen register r.
We can assume that the algorithm will avoid allowing any processes to survive by having them access registers with known labels. The algorithm can force the adversary to crash up to t − i processes for each register with known label * , to which no process has written during E i−1 v . There are at most i − 1 such registers, since at most one additional unreserved register is made known each round. This causes at most (t − i)(i − 1) < t 2 processes to crash. Thus, there are more than s i−1 − t 2 active processes that will have pending accesses to registers with unknown labels at the end of round i − 1.
If the algorithm forces the third branch of the adversary's strategy in round i, then there are at most s i − t − i processes with pending accesses to each register r with unknown label. These processes survive only if (r) = v and the biased coin-flip for register r permits it to be accessed, which has probability 1/t. From Lemma 8, the probability that (r) = v (conditioned on E i−1 v ) is at least 1 8tm 2 , giving a conditional probability of at least 1 8t 2 m 2 that the processes accessing some register r survive. Translating this into a bound on the number of survivors requires a slight variant on standard Chernoff bounds, which we state and prove below. 
Proof The proof follows the standard Chernoff bound proof, augmented with an appeal to convexity. Compute
The first inequality uses the fact that 1 + x ≤ exp(x) and the second inequality uses the convexity of the function exp(αx) − 1. When α < 0, Markov's inequality implies that
In particular, when α = ln(1 − δ)/M, we get
We use Lemma 9 to obtain the next result. Proof First let us compute a lower bound on the expected number of active processes. As argued previously, at least s i−1 − t 2 processes attempt to access registers with unknown labels in round i. The probability that each such process survives is at least 1 8t 2 m 2 , by Lemma 8 and the fact that the processes accessing a register with label v survive with probability 1/t.
Lemma 10
Let S be the random variable counting the number of processes that survive round i. Then
The last inequality uses the fact that tm ≥ 4. Because at most s i + t − i process attempt to access any one register r, we can let M = 2s i > s i + t − i and get μ/M ≥ s i tm/2 2s i = tm/4. Now fix δ = 1/2 and apply Lemma 9 to get
Because ( √ 2/e) tm/4 drops exponentially fast, it is less than 1 2tm when tm is sufficiently large. A numerical calculation shows that tm ≥ 150 is enough.
To complete the proof of Lemma 7, observe that the m executions E 1 , . . . , E m include mt rounds between them. In each of these rounds, the probability that the adversary strategy fails is at most 1 2tm , by either Corollary 2 or Lemma 10, depending on whether the algorithm forces the first or third branch of the adversary's strategy. Summing these probabilities over all mt rounds gives a total probability of failure at most 1/2. It follows that the adversary strategy succeeds with nonzero probability and that a set of executions as described in Lemma 7 exists.
Interleaving the Executions
The next step is to show how these executions can be interleaved to violate the requirements of a conflict detector if t is too small.
Given an execution E v of many copies of check(v) as constructed in Lemma 7, let W v be the set of unreserved registers r that processes in E v write to, and let X v be the set of unreserved registers that processes in E v read from but do not write to. Let A v be the permutation of W v ∪ X v arranged in the order in which registers in W v are first written and the registers in X v are last read in E v .
The following is analogous to Lemma 5 for the anonymous case.
Lemma 11 For all distinct input values u and v, if E u and E v each include a process that returns false, then there exist two registers
Proof Suppose otherwise. We construct an execution E that interleaves E u and E v and which is indistinguishable from E u and E v by the processes in each of these executions. The interleaving is done round-by-round. Consider each register r that occurs in both A u and A v . If r ∈ W u ∩ W v , the rounds in which it is first written are scheduled together. If r ∈ X u ∩ X v , the rounds in which it is last read are scheduled together. Otherwise, the round in which r is first written is scheduled just after the round in the other execution in which r is last read. Remaining rounds are interleaved arbitrarily. This interleaving is feasible since the orderings A u and A v are consistent.
With this interleaving, in any round where a register r in A u ∩ A v is read by a process with input u, it observes either the initial value of register r, a value written to r in the same round of E u , or a value written to r by a write delayed from a previous round of E u . Any read of a register that is in A u , but not A v , returns only its initial value or a value written by a process with input u. In each case, E is indistinguishable from E u to processes with input u. The same argument holds for v.
Since E u and E v each include a process that returns false, the same occurs in E, violating the specification of a conflict detector.
Proof of the Lower Bound
It follows that when m and n are large enough to apply Lemma 7, we can apply Lemma 6 to get t! ≥ m, where t is the minimum length of any execution of check. When n is unbounded, this gives t = Ω( log m log log m ) as in the anonymous case. For bounded n, we need 8 t m 3t+1 t 3t+1 ≤ n to apply Lemma 7, which is equivalent to t log 8 + (3t + 1) log m + (3t + 1) log t ≤ log n. Setting m = √ log n and t = fact −1 (m) = Θ( √ log n log log n ) satisfies this bound for sufficiently large m, giving a combined bound of:
Theorem 2
In any deterministic implementation of a conflict detector for n process with m input values, there is an execution in which some process takes Ω min log m log log m , √ log n log log n steps.
The main differences between this bound and the anonymous bound are the assumption that the algorithm is deterministic and a much stronger dependence on n. We can show that at least part of this second difference is necessary, by showing that removing anonymity allows for a more efficient conflict detector for bounded n and unbounded m.
An Improved Upper Bound for Non-anonymous Conflict Detectors
For anonymous adopt-commit objects, the best bound we can get on the running time as a function of n alone is O(n). This is not the case when processes have identities. In this case, we can build a conflict detector that supports arbitrarily many values by placing the processes at the leaves of a strict binary tree T with n nodes, O(log n) height, and a 2-valued conflict detector at each internal node. This is analogous to the classic tournament algorithm for mutual exclusion of Peterson and Fischer [22] . The conflict detector used at each internal node is the conflict detector described at the beginning of Sect. 3. It is implemented by a pair of registers, one at each of its two children.
Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 5. A conflict is detected at an internal node if distinct values have been written to the registers at its two children. A process detects no conflict if it detects no conflict at any level on the path from its leaf to the root.
To show this works, we first prove a simple fact. Now consider any internal node x and assume the claim is true for both children of x. Suppose that process p writes v to x.register and p writes v to x.register. Because the loop in Algorithm 5 proceeds from a leaf to the root, a process only writes to the register at an internal node after it has written the same value to the register at one of its children. Therefore, if p and p previously wrote to the register at the same child of x, then v = v by the induction hypothesis.
Otherwise, p wrote v to the register at node y and p wrote v to the to the register at node y , where y and y are the two children of node x. Suppose p wrote to y.register first. Then p cannot read ⊥ from y.register, so, by the induction hypothesis, it read value v. This implies that v = v; otherwise p returns true before writing to x.register.
Theorem 3 Algorithm 5 implements a conflict detector with O(log n) worst-case step complexity.
Proof If two processes have different inputs, they can't both write to the register at the same child of the root. If they write to different children of the root, both can't read ⊥ from the other child of the root, so at least one returns true.
If all processes have the same input v, no value other than v is written to any register, so no process reads a value other than v or ⊥. In this case, no process returns true.
The step complexity of the algorithm is proportional to the height of T , which is O(log n).
There is still a substantial gap between the O(log n) upper bound in Theorem 3 and the Ω( √ log n log log n ) lower bound in Theorem 2. We conjecture that O(log n) is closer to the correct value.
A Lower Bound for Randomized Non-anonymous Implementations
In the anonymous case, the lower bound on a deterministic m-valued conflict detector translates directly into a lower bound on the fastest possible solo execution of a randomized implementation against an oblivious adversary (Corollary 1). This result depends on cloning and does not apply in the non-anonymous case. However, we can say something about the expected worst-case running time.
Theorem 4
In any randomized implementation of a conflict detector for n processes and m input values, there is an input v and an oblivious adversary that uses n/m processes with input v, so that, with probability 1, there is at least one process that takes Ω min log m log log m , √ log n log log n steps.
Proof Let E v (r) denote the execution constructed in the proof of Lemma 7 when the random bits provided to the processes are fixed to the sequence r (thus making the algorithm deterministic). Suppose there exists t ∈ o(min((log m)/ log log m, √ log n/ log log n)) and a sequence r 0 of random bits, which occurs with probability Pr[r = r 0 ] > 0, such that, for all inputs v, execution E v (r 0 ) finishes in at most t steps. Then the proof of Theorem 2 implies that there is an interleaving of two of these executions in which processes from both executions return false. An oblivious adversary can cause this interleaving, producing an incorrect execution with non-zero probability. This is a much weaker result than Corollary 1. In the anonymous case, we could guarantee that no process beat the lower bound. Here, we can only say that some process doesn't, but it may be that almost all processes finish in O(1) time and that any particular process finishes in O(1) expected time. Whether or not this is actually possible remains open.
Consequences for Consensus
Now, we consider the effect of our improved bounds for adopt-commit objects on the consensus problem. In the consensus problem, n processes must agree on a value, which must be equal to the input of some process. A protocol is randomized waitfree if every process completes its execution in a finite expected number of steps, regardless of the scheduling of the other processes or the occurrence up to n − 1 crash failures.
The cost of consensus depends strongly on the power of the adversary that controls scheduling and process failures and, to a lesser extent, on the number of possible values. For an adaptive adversary, which can observe the internal states of the processes, there is a tight bound of Θ(n) on the individual step complexity of binary (two-valued) consensus [4, 6] . The high cost of consensus in this model has led to examination of models with weaker adversaries, particularly adversaries that are prevented from changing the schedule based on coin-flip values known only to one process.
One approach is to limit the adversary's ability to observe the state of the system. A value-oblivious adversary [8] [9] [10] cannot observe the internal states of processes, the contents of registers, or pending operations. It bases its choice of schedule only on the history of which operations the processes have applied to which registers. The best currently known protocol in this model, due to Aumann [8] , achieves consensus with O(log n) expected individual step complexity for any number of input values.
An alternative is to give extra power to the algorithm by allowing probabilistic writes [1, 11, 12] , where a process can flip a coin and choose to execute a write operation or not based on the outcome of the coin-flip, without affecting the scheduling done by the adversary. In this model, a protocol of Aspnes [3] , based on combining adopt-commit objects and a class of randomized objects called conciliators, gives an anonymous protocol for m-valued consensus with expected O(log m + log n) individual step complexity, where O(log m) is the cost of the adopt-commit and O(log n) is the cost of the conciliator using implementations given in [3] .
An oblivious adversary that must fix the schedule in advance, without seeing the actions of the processes, gives an even stronger model than both the value-oblivious and probabilistic-write models. (As observed in [3] , a process in an obliviousadversary model can simulate a probabilistic write by choosing randomly between carrying out a write and a dummy operation.) In this model, Attiya and CensorHillel [7] have shown that any protocol with two input values runs for at least k steps with probability c −k for some constant c, a bound that translates into constant expected individual step complexity.
Our results improve the previous upper bound for the probabilistic-write model and give a non-trivial lower bound on expected individual step complexity for the oblivious-adversary model when the number of input values m is ω (1) . For the probabilistic-write model, substituting our improved adopt-commit implementations for the adopt-commit object in [3] reduces the expected individual step complexity from O(log m + log n) to O(min( log m log log m , n) + log n) in the anonymous case and O(log n) in the non-anonymous case. For the oblivious-adversary model, our lower bound on anonymous adopt-commit objects gives an immediate Ω(min( log m log log m , n)) lower bound with probability 1 on the worst-case individual step complexity of anonymous m-valued consensus implementations, because consensus objects satisfy the specification of adopt-commit objects. This is the first lower bound for consensus for which the number of values m is significant.
Conclusions
We have shown how to reduce adopt-commit objects to and from conflict detectors, which are simpler, and used these reductions to get tight bounds on the individual step complexity of anonymous m-valued adopt-commit objects. These bounds also translate into improved bounds on anonymous m-valued consensus. We have also shown bounds for the deterministic non-anonymous case, which give an exponential separation between the anonymous and non-anonymous cases as a function of n.
The natural questions are to determine tight bounds for non-anonymous implementations and whether randomization could allow further improvements. A lower bound on the space complexity of m-valued conflict detectors would also be interesting.
